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No class of public servants should be more completely above political influence both in action and selection, than those charged with the construction and application of the law. This applies forcibly to judges holding inferior positions, but it applies even more forcibly to those called upon to administer the law in courts of last resort. Heretofore in the selection of judges of our higher courts, political motives, methods and influences have been absent to a remarkable degree. But there have been notable exceptions and there seems now to be a tendency to make political reasons of first importance in the choice of candidates for judicial honors. If such a tendency does exist, if there is danger that purely political considerations are to weigh either in the election or rejection of a candidate for position on the bench, it is time to call a halt, it is time for honorable members of an honorable profession to direct their best efforts toward the eradication of the politician's influence in this matter wherever or whenever it may display itself. This is vital. Without a pure and upright judiciary chosen by fair and honorable methods, respect for the law will cease to be a reality, and without respect for law and for legal authority our boasted institutions are worth less than the parchment upon which our Constitution is written.

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A WRITER in a leading religious weekly has recently taken occasion to criticise a decision rendered by a Justice of the United States Supreme Court. It appears to us that it is hardly within the province of such a journal to enter into a discussion of the

merits or demerits of a decision, upon questions which for their solution require knowledge of a science so distinct as that of the law. No matter how correct a man's ideas of natural justice may be, he is not, by virtue of that fact alone, rendered competent to sit in judgment upon the findings of any man whose life has been spent at the bar and upon the bench. And surely it would seem that a writer upon religious topics treads upon very perilous ground when he not only invades the realm of the law but imposes upon himself the duty of correcting one whose legal learning, uprightness of character and judicial training have fitted him for a position as Associate Justice of the highest tribunal in the land. We would not take it upon ourselves to say that all decisions made by members of our highest Federal Court are just, in the common acceptance of that word; nor even that such decisions are invariably correct in law. "To err is human," and the best of judges are subject to human infirmities. But we do insist that law as such should be carefully and consistently distinguished from what, for want of a better term, we call "natural justice." Let us add, in a spirit of kindly suggestion, that in common with all lovers of good government, the Press owes a duty to our judicial department—that of doing all in its power to maintain in the public mind a sense of the inviolability of the law. Even now forces are operating in society which, unless checked in their operation, may one day result in breaking down those rights which are most sacred and upon which our civilization and government rest. The error in a single judicial decision will in time find its appropriate remedy. The harm which may possibly result from over-criticism of our courts can never be remedied.